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Abstract 
After a short introduction on the genesis and development of the general consociational 
democracy model, the paper discusses: 1. the extent to which the Netherlands did embody 
the consociational democracy model as developed by Arend Lijphart at the end of the 1960s; 2. 
social changes since then which have caused the crumbling of the once distinct subcultures; 
3. attempts at a majoritarian restructuring of the Dutch political system; 4. attacks on 
corporatist structures in the name of partisan) electoral primacy; 5. persisting consociational 
features of the system, rooted in elite political culture on the one hand, and strong traditions of 
autonomy for minorities on the other. A separate appendix discusses the extent to which 
changed social circumstances have affected the role of political parties. 
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Rarely has a country been put so convincingly onto the map of comparative politics as The 
Netherlands was by my one-time fellow countryman, now an American citizen, Arend Lijphart 
who derived his model of a ‘consociational democracy’ from it. I first read the Lijphart book 
entitled  The Politics of Accommodation. Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands when 
the University of California Press asked me in the fall of 1966 to be a ‘reader’ of the manuscript. 
I well remember my exhilaration with what was clearly both an intelligent and highly original 
study. It was written in terms of a deviant case analysis. In fact, the word ‘consociational 
democracy’ is not even found in the index of the original 1968 edition (it is in the 1975 second 
edition). But already in a paper which Lijphart wrote at my suggestion for the 1967 IPSA 
Congress in Brussels,
1 in which he challenged the then influential typology of European politics 
put forward by Gabriel Almond, a more general model began to appear which Lijphart 
elaborated further in a World Politics article in 1969.
2 Before I discuss the Netherlands, let me 
note some general points on the consociational democracy model.
3 
First, although Lijphart became and remained by far the most influential ‘founding father’ of the 
model, similar conclusions were elaborated independently at about the same time by others, 
notably Gerhard Lehmbruch in his excellent small book on Proporzdemokratie
4 based mainly 
on comparative insights on Austria and Switzerland, and by Jurg Steiner who worked on his 
dissertation on Swiss politics in Mannheim.
5 A major factor explaining these simultaneous 
developments was the common rejection by these authors of the relevance of the Westminster 
type of government which tended normatively to overshadow the experiences of other European 
democracies. 
Second, while the model was initially elaborated as a manner to put certain European politics 
on the map of comparative European politics (with Switzerland, the Netherlands, Belgium and 
Austria as the major examples), Lijphart was soon to expand the model also to other polities 
(including such different ones as pre-1976 Lebanon, Malaysia or Colombia).
6 He thus started 
on a road which led him later to develop the polar types of ‘majoritarian’ versus ‘consensus 
government’, empirically validated with the aid of two dimensions in a comparative analysis of 
twenty-one countries (representing twenty-two cases as France figures twice) in his highly 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
1 It was published  under the title ‘Typologies of Democratic Systems’, as the lead-article in the first issue of 
Comparative Political Studies, vol. 1  nr. 1 (April 1968), pp. 3–44. 
2 A. Lijphart, ‘Consociational Democracy’, World Politics, vol 21, nr. 2 (1969), pp. 207–225. 
3 One cannot help repeating oneself in this respect. See for an earlier and fuller comment my review of the 
consociational democracy literature in H. Daalder, ‘The Consociational Democracy Theme’, World Politics, vol. 26, 
nr. 4 (1974), pp. 604–221, as well as H. Daalder, Ancient and Modern Pluralism in the Netherlands, Working 
paper nr. 22, Center for European Studies, Harvard University, 1989–1990, notably chapter 2, pp. 24–47. 
4 Gerhard Lehmbruch, Proporzdemokratie. Tuebingen: Mohr, 1967. 
5 J. Steiner, Gewaltlose Politik und kulturelle Vielfalt. Hypothesen entwickelt am Beispiel der Schweiz, Bern: Paul 
Haupt, 1970; later English edition: Amicable Agreement versus Majority Rule. Conflict Resolution in Switzerland, 
Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1974. 
6 See the consolidation of his arguments in: A. Lijphart,  Democracy in Plural Societies. A Comparative 
Exploration, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977. 8 — Hans Daalder / The Netherlands: Still a Consociational Democracy?— I H S 
influential book Democracies (1984).
7 One might note, in passing, that many of the variables 
Lijphart singled out in these two dimensions are institutional ones. This showed a salutary 
retreat from excessively behaviorist analyses which for long tended to neglect institutional 
factors in the study of comparative politics.  
Thirdly, and not accidentally, the model  also acquired, at least in the hands of its main creator, 
a strong normative overtone. It increasingly was thought to provide valuable lessons for those 
who wished to engage in constitutional engineering. It challenged prevalent Anglo-American 
tendencies to believe in the superiority of Westminster-type arrangements, notably in the case 
of societies with strong subcultural divisions of one kind or another. In this context, one should 
note Lijphart`s early plea for consociational arrangements in the case of South Africa, 
contained in an unfortunately lesser-known book of his, entitled Power-sharing in South Africa.
8 
When this book appeared in 1984 it seemed strangely distant from the violent tensions in that 
country. But in fact, it forecast in an uncanny manner the political agenda of things to come in 
South Africa. One should also note that this book contains a chapter in which Lijphart offers his 
most precise and elaborate Auseinandersetzung with his critics.  
But enough on the general model. Let us focus on the Netherlands. 
How right was Lijphart in his analysis of the Netherlands as a consociational 
democracy model? 
Lijphart`s book would not have been so influential and long-lasting if it had been far off the mark 
in its analysis of Dutch politics. Whereas the English-language edition went through only two 
editions, the Dutch edition
9 had an unparalleled success in going through as many as nine 
editions in the twenty years since it was first published (also in 1968). The book contained a 
graphic analysis of the strong segmentation of Dutch society and of the importance of elite 
accommodation. It was particularly convincing in his analysis of the manner of policy-making 
succinctly summarized by him in terms of seven ‘rules of the game’ to which I will return at the 
end of this lecture.
10 
Yet, at the same time the model also calls for a number of critical footnotes when held against 
the actual record of Dutch political history. A real treatment of this point would lead us into 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
7 A. Lijphart, Democracies. Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries, New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1984. 
8 A. Lijphart, Power-Sharing in South-Africa, Institute of International Studies, University of California, Berkeley, 
1984.  
9 The Dutch edition, translated and revised by Lijphart himself, was entitled Verzuiling, Pacificatie en Kentering in 
de Nederlandse Politiek, Amsterdam: De Bussy, 1968.  
10 The Politics of Accommodation, chapter 7. I H S — Hans Daalder / The Netherlands: Still a Consociational Democracy?— 9 
lengthy historical analyses.
11 Given the limited format of a public lecture – not to speak of the 
traditional canons of rethorica – let me concentrate on three points. 
First, the model was developed in the mid-1960s, at a time when many of its most 
characteristic features had already begun to crack up in The Netherlands. Lijphart did of course 
notice this, even in the first edition of  The Politics of Accommodation, and more fully in the 
second edition, as well in the later Dutch editions of his book. He deliberately changed his 
descriptive passages from the present tense he used in the first edition to the past tense in the 
latter. 
Second, within the Lijphart analysis there remained something of a puzzle. If tensions between 
subcultures were so strong, why was it that elites still had the will and the power to contain 
these tensions, by engaging into what Lijphart termed a ‘self-denying hypothesis’? Although 
Lijphart analyzed the subcultural divisions of the 1950s and 1960s, he dated the relevant elite 
accommodation around 1917, at the time of what the Dutch call the Pacificatie, when in one 
great compromise all parties agreed to accept general suffrage, proportional representation and 
full freedoms and subsidies for religious schools. But by 1910 the historical record did not see 
the fully crystallized subcultures which in Lijphart’s model formed such a real peril that the 
elites simply had to act to prevent a break-up. In fact, such subcultural segmentation as came 
about was as much the consequence as the cause of the 1917 settlement. I have therefore 
argued many a time that Lijphart found a ‘solution’ for a problem which was mainly of his own 
making – or to be more fair: which were derived from a preoccupation of American theories of 
the time. Instead, I have argued, older traditions of elite accommodation, which had their roots 
in the Dutch Republic and the specific manner of state-formation in the Netherlands, were the 
very reason why subcultural divisions could develop without endangering the system in the first 
place. 
Third, there is also something mechanistic in the Lijphart analysis. He speaks of different 
blocs, and portrays them as alike in most respects. Yet in doing so, he tends to give 
insufficient weight to the substantial differences between the three major subcultures of 
Calvinists, Catholics and Socialists. If Calvinists were, with the Liberals, historically near to the 
centers of power and the concept of the nation, Catholics and Socialists represented very 
much separate and subordinate groupings which only came to be fully accepted as senior 
partners in government by 1939 or even 1946. Some have therefore spoken of a ‘second 
pacification’ in  1939 when Socialists were for the first time given cabinet seats. Also, the 
Lijphart analysis tends to pay too little attention to internal differences of the subcultures, 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
11 The two most elaborate statements by myself are in: H. Daalder, ‘The Netherlands: Opposition in a Segmented 
Society’, in: R.A. Dahl ed., Political Oppositions in Western Democracies, New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1966, pp. 188–236; and in: H. Daalder, ‘Consociationalism, Center and Periphery in the Netherlands’, in: Per Torsvik 
ed.,  Mobilization, Center-Periphery Structures and Nation-Building. A Volume in Commemoration of Stein 
Rokkan, Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1981, pp. 181–240. 10 — Hans Daalder / The Netherlands: Still a Consociational Democracy?— I H S 
which also played a substantial role in the manner in which they eventually were to dissolve 
and to crumble. 
Having thus ‘set the stage’, let us turn now to the major topic of this lecture: 
Is the Netherlands still a consociational democracy? 
Lijphart has in later work distinguished four ‘basic elements of consociational democracy: 1. 
executive power-sharing among the representatives of all significant goups; 2. a high degree of 
internal autonomy for groups that wish to have it; c. proportional representation and proportional 
allocation of civil service positions and public funds; and 4. a minority veto on the most vital 
issues’.
12 
Let me make two preliminary remarks. One should note first that the Netherlands have never 
had full power-sharing through ‘grand coalitions’ or ‘all-party’ cabinets: even though many 
coalitons have been broad-based, at least one major party has at all times been left out. For 
much the longest period since World War II (to be exact: from 1952 to 1994) this meant either 
the Socialists or the Liberals, as at least one of the religious parties was always represented in 
cabinets since the advent of universal suffrage and proportional representation in 1918. 
Second, the Netherlands have not seen the full carving up of the state in offices and services, 
as seems to be true of the more extreme Proporz-system found in Austria. The bureaucracy, 
the judiciary, the military, the monarchy, and generally even the work-place, remained relatively 
free from the effects of full ideological segmentation. In fact, the system was characterized 
more by a fargoing autonomy for the subcultures in the cultural and social spheres (with 
subsidies being shared out proportionally among the subcultures) than by a full partisan 
penetration in the commanding heights of the polity. 
Historically, the Netherlands undoubtedly presented a case of strong social segmentation. The 
Dutch metaphor is that of  Verzuiling, or pillarization. In the last few decades the pillars have 
crumbled. One of the main props of the consociational democracy model: its strong articulation 
of separate subcultures, is therefore no longer present in the Netherlands. 
Why did such developments take place? One must think of three different factors: elite re-
orientation, mass secularization, and increasing social differentiation causing social 
organizations to become more and more disentangled from the ideological subculture in which 
they had originally developed.
13  
                                                                                                                                                                                        
12 See Power-Sharing in South Africa, p. 8. 
13 I have analyzed these processes at much greater length in a Dutch-language essay ‘Zestig jaar Nederland 
(1926–1986)’, in: J.H. van den Heuvel et al. Een Vrij Zinnige Verhouding. De VPRO en Nederland 1926–1986, I H S — Hans Daalder / The Netherlands: Still a Consociational Democracy?— 11 
First, under the impact of the challenges of totalitarian movements, the threats of war, poverty 
in the Third World, and domestic strains, both the orthodox-Calvinist and Catholic elites begun 
to move as early as the 1930s away from an overwhelming orientation towards the Jenseits to 
a more direct concern with the  Diesseits. If this led to a more immediate concern with the 
political and social problems of the contemporary world, it also caused increasing dissension 
among the elites of the various religious groups on the practical stand tot be taken by the 
churches, and the various institutions within each religious subculture. Some began to 
question even the need for continuing social organizations on the basis of specific creed. If at 
one time Dutch Calvinists and Catholics presented an image of rocklike introvert bastions, they 
increasingly became a house divided. Characteristially, in the 1960s the Dutch Catholic 
Church, which had once been called the Pope’s most faithful daughter, achieved the doubtful 
status of the Vatican’s greatest problem child. 
Second, growing elite disunity went hand in hand with what in a comparative perspective was a 
rather late, but all the more rapid process of mass secularization. The Netherlands changed 
from being one of the most church-going nations in Western Europe, to one as secular as any. 
And it did so within one generation. 
Third, the once so coherent religious subcultures were also undermined by processes of 
increasing internal differentiation. Each subculture had built up its own specialized 
organizations to take care of particular economic and social activities in such different areas as 
industrial relations, health care, social work or l eisure, in close interaction with the 
development of the welfare state. But once established, such organizations became 
increasingly professionalized and bureaucratized. In the process they tended to develop closer 
contacts with similar organizations in other subcultures (and with specialized sections of the 
government bureaucracy which regulated and subsidized organizations in particular sectors) 
than they had with institutions and organizations within their own subculture. As more and 
more organizations w ent their own way, the institutional cohesion of the different subcultures 
was thus largely destroyed. A system consisting of rather rigid hierarchical subcultures was 
gradually replaced by a welter of independent organizational networks which connected 
specialized agencies and parts of the bureaucracy in the making and implementation of 
policies. There was, one might say, a self-destructing logic in  Verzuiling- process: its very 
success in fostering all manner of sectoral organizations within subcultures, created so many 
sectoral interests across them, that this eventually spelled the demise of the subcultures as 
cohesive units. 
                                                                                                                                          
Baarn: Ambo, 1986, pp. 11–71. For a parallel analysis in the perspective of an alleged Politikver-drossenheit, see 
my chapter in: M. Schmidt Hrsg.,  Politikversagen?  Parteienverschleisz? Bürgerverdrusz?, Universität 
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If this particularly affected the two major religious subcultures, the Socialist world also 
experienced processes of organizational disintegration. As a minority movement in a social 
system dominated by others, the Socialists had formed a subculture of its own. The ideological 
boundaries of the Socialist subculture had been less strong, however, than that of Calvinists 
and Catholics. Its sway over their followers was less comprehensive, not least because the 
Socialists shared a ‘general’, non-fundamentalist or secular outlook with the Liberals. Their 
main organizational principle: class, did not provide an exclusive or durable basis either. Many 
workers were in fact organized in the rival religious subcultures, and remained there, Socialist 
siren songs or struggles notwithstanding. There were also many uncertainties regarding the 
borderline between workers and ‘the’ middle class so that there was no definite divide between 
Socialists and Liberals. In the economic expansion after World War II, the very definition of 
class became even more blurred. On the one hand many new middling strata arose, and on the 
other hand ‘workers’ declined in relative numbers. And those remaining were increasingly 
divided over such matters as differential incomes, the burden of social security, crime, or more 
recently the place of new immigrants.  
All in all, then, both religion and class lost precision and relevance, whether in political and 
social organization or in voting behavior. Instead a system developed characterized by a great 
many specialized interest organizations, and many more volatile voters. 
The majoritarian temptation 
Volatile voters changed the political universe. Parties could no longer rely on their own 
clienteles to reconfirm existing power relations. Increased electoral opportunities offered new 
temptations, notably for secular parties seeking to win one-time voters from the religious 
parties. Socialists and Liberals believed themselves to be the main potential beneficiaries from 
processes of secularization. In this they had to compete, however, with a number of new 
parties which had to cross only the lowest possible electoral threshold in The Netherlands, 
while they also had to cope with a much increased voter abstention following the abolition of 
compulsory appearance at the ballot-box introduced in 1970. Meanwhile the religious parties 
did not remain passive either: following heavy electoral losses party in three successive 
elections of 1967, 1971 and 1972 by both the Catholic party and a less-structured protestant 
Christian-Historical Union, the three major religious parties (one Catholic party and two 
Protestant) eventually decided to federate first (1976), and then to merge into one new 
Christian Democrat Party (CDA) in 1980. 
But new electoral opportunities did create new majoritarian pressures. Socialists and Liberals 
took up increasingly polarized stands to one another. Declaring that they would on no condition 
enter into coalition with one another they both sought to win votes from the religious parties, 
promising more clear-cut choices.  I H S — Hans Daalder / The Netherlands: Still a Consociational Democracy?— 13 
If this represented a common rationale for Socialists and Liberals, the conditions were not 
symmetrical. The Liberals being a relatively small party knew that they could never hope for an 
independent electoral mandate. Hence they pleaded for a standing coalition of the CDA and 
themselves, or at times for a national coalition. The Socialists, and other new progressive 
parties such as Democrats’66 and a new split-away Christian-Radical Party (PPR), did see 
greater electoral opportunities. They pleaded for changes which would replace the traditional 
post-electoral coalition bargaining by a system in which the voters would give a more 
immediate and decisive mandate to alternative governments. Two, somewhat different reforms 
were put forward by the Left to secure such a direct reform: one institutional, the other one 
consisting of a strategic change in party behavior. 
Notably the new Democrats’66 party (its name refers to the year when this party was 
established) campaigned for a constitutional reform, which would introduce the direct election 
of a Prime Minister. They accepted the full implications of such a reform, which would give 
separate and possibly conflicting mandates to an executive and a parliament, with the 
argument that such a dualism would free parliament from the burden of forming and sustaining 
government coalitions, and thus make parliament a more independent controller of the 
executive. The proposal was soon whittled down to one for the choice of a cabinet formateur 
only, however, who would be chosen directly by the electorate provided he obtained an absolute 
majority. Such a formateur would otherwise have to respect all canons of a normal 
parliamentary system, including full ministerial responsibility. Even in this attenuated form, the 
proposal for a direct choice was voted down repeatedly and convincingly (once in 1971 and 
again in  1975) by both the religious parties and the Liberals. 
As an alternative, the Left proposed the formation of electoral cartels by parties, who would 
submit a common program and a common list of ministers, under the explicit understanding 
that these would not be negotiable in case the new cartel would not gain the hoped-for backing 
of a majority. During the early seventies, this strategy seemed to promise success as it 
resulted in the formation of the Den Uyl Cabinet (1973-1977) which was centered very much on 
the left, w ith only minority participation on the part of ministers of two of the three religious 
parties. But on the long run, the total Left vote remained far removed from an independent 
majority. Deliberate polarization by the Left condemned it since 1977 for more than a decade to 
the opposition benches, from which they were only freed, not by increased electoral support, 
but by dissension among the alternative coalition of the religious parties and the Liberals. In 
fact, the polarization tactics from the Left had  been a major factor in the decision of the 
religious parties to merge, and it helped to bolster the image of the new CDA party as the more 
reliable party of government which made the newly merged Christian Democrats under Ruud 
Lubbers in the 1980s even attractive to voters not normally belonging to the religious fold. 
Eventually, the Socialists returned to a ‘normal’ coalition with the Christian-Democrats in 1989. 
That coalition ruled for four years, but then led in 1994 to the greatest electoral losses any 14 — Hans Daalder / The Netherlands: Still a Consociational Democracy?— I H S 
Dutch coalition has ever experienced: in a parliament of 150 members the Christian-Democrats 
went down from 54 to 34 seats, and the Socialists from 49 to 37. The major winners, apart from 
a new party of the elderly were the Liberals (now with 31 seats) and Democrats’ 66 (gaining an 
unprecedented 24 seats). The outcome was such that at least three parties were required to 
form a parliamentary majority. Eventually a so-called ‘purple coalition’ was formed, which 
included Socialists, Liberals and D’66, but excluded for the first time since 1918 ministers 
belonging to a much weakened Christian-Democrat world. 
If this coalition is relatively broad-based, it is far removed from the grand coalition posited by 
the consociational democracy model. In an older terminology of party typologies: the Dutch 
party system has come to represent rather more an ‘even four-party system’, presenting ‘open 
choices’. Said differently: the tenet of full power-sharing, on the basis of secure party divisions, 
is a world apart from a system which my late friend, the American historian Val R. Lorwin once 
dubbed in a deliberate play on long German words a system of Allgemeinkoalitions-fähigkeit 
with highly volatile voters. 
Corporate traditions under increasing attack 
Many of us have seen definite similarities between ‘consocia-tionalist’ and ‘corporatist’ politics. 
I have signalled before that the simultaneous build-up of the different subcultures did indeed 
make for a world of extensive sectoral organizations, which assumed corporatist features as 
they moved across subcultural dividing lines and became intertwined with specialized 
government agencies. 
In the last decades, however, such corporatist arrangements have increasingly come under 
attack, from two at first sight very different – but on closer inspection somewhat related  – 
quarters. 
One is the assumption of the ‘primacy of politics’. Not least through the Left’s advocacy of 
more direct electoral decisions, however unsuccessful, the partisan-electoral channel has 
gained in importance o ver that of corporate representation and accommodation. Parties no 
longer consider themselves spokesmen or sentinels of a welter of specific subcultural 
interests, but have deliberately sought more autonomous stances. Instead they feel bound to 
detailed government programs worked out during lengthy bargaining in the process of coalition 
formation. From that basis successive governments have not only been less respectful of group 
accommodation processes, but have even began to question their legitimacy. There is now 
something of a war going on against the ‘unwarranted access’ to government enjoyed by 
private interests represented in a myriad of advisory agencies. Such bodies are thought to 
make for ‘treaclish politics’ and to obfuscate political responsibilities. Numerous advisory 
agencies have therefore been disbanded. To what extent many of such groups have now settled I H S — Hans Daalder / The Netherlands: Still a Consociational Democracy?— 15 
comfortably in the halflight of the Antichambres, to which Cavour rightly preferred a more public 
Chambre, is not clear. 
The second factor  – which works against corporate networks as well against an increasing 
number of government bureaus  – has been the increased reliance on market forces. Such 
developments come out particularly in widescale ‘privatization drives’ as well as in an increased 
reliance on (very highly paid) consultants, interim managers and their like. The latter have often 
replaced earlier advisory agencies. This has resulted in so much ‘rent-a-government’ that I 
could not help to point to them in my farewell lecture at Leiden in  1993 as a fourth elite 
category of ‘calculating contractors’, functioning besides the three more traditional elite groups 
of ‘magistrats’ in charge of independent offices, career civil servants, and politicians produced 
by partisan-electoral channels.
14 As such independent ‘experts’ are often hired to legitimate 
specific policies, they bolster the stance of politicians in favor of ‘the primacy of politics’, 
thwarted by the earlier need for corporate consultations. 
Whatever relevance is there still in the consociational model in the present-day 
Netherlands? 
At first sight, the answer to this question would seem to be negative: the crumbling of the 
traditional pillars, increased electoral volatility, majoritarian temptations, parties as largely 
autonomous agents, fargoing challenges to corporate networks: all that would seem a far cry 
from the neat consociational model which many observers stil believe to characterize the 
Netherlands. Of the four major characteristics of the model the idea of full executive power-
sharing, of a high degree of internal autonomy, of minority vetoes on the most vital issues, 
would not appear to be very relevant anymore. At most one could say that the principle of 
proportional representation still holds. One might argue that the role  of parties in the 
proportional allocation of civil service position and public funds has increased somewhat, 
paradoxically at the same time that parties have lost in other functions they traditionally 
represented. 
However, for at least two reasons, one should be careful not to draw too drastic conclusions. 
In the first place, one should note an interesting article by Arend Lijphart, in which he re-
assesses his own analysis of Dutch politics in the light of his new insights on comparative 
democracies, including the somewhat wider notion of ‘consensus government’.
15 He proves, to 
his evident satisfaction, that the Netherlands did not move very greatly after all in its position on 
the two fundamental dimensions which he uses in his comparative placement of democratic 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
14 See H. Daalder, Van oude en nieuwe regenten, of: Politiek als beroep, Leiden 1993; reprinted in H. Daalder, Van 
Oude en nieuwe regenten. Politiek in Nederland, Amsterdam: Bert Bakker, pp. 101–137. 
15 A. Lijphart, ‘From the Politics of Accomodation to Adversarial Politics in the Netherlands: A Reassessment’, West 
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political systems, remaining very much a clear example on the opposite side to Westminster 
government. In other words: even though the Netherlands may no longer be a ‘consociational 
democracy’, it certain still belongs to the category of ‘consensus government.’ 
Secondly, I must return to my own earlier argument with Lijphart on the issue of elite 
accommodation. As you will remember, I emphasized that such accommodation did not result 
from what Lijphart called his ‘self-denying prophesy’ – that is: elites being aware of imminent 
dangers taking effective measures to prevent these from coming true  – but from much older 
traditions in the political culture of the Netherlands. Such traditions did not only prevent the 
system from actually showing the strains which Lijphart thought he saw, but also helped to 
explain better the later processes of both the building and the crumbling of the different ‘pillars’. 
Such traditions have not disappeared in the Netherlands. 
One can illustrate this if one does not concentrate so much on Lijpharts four major 
characteristics of ‘consociational democracy’, but on the seven ‘rules of the game’ which 
Lijphart had singled out: government as ‘business’ (instead of a ‘game’), agreement to 
disagree, summit diplomacy, proportionality, depoliticization, secrecy, and the Government’s 
right to govern. Many of these rules still hold in Dutch policy-making: it still is extremely 
serious, there is an abiding emphasis on the Government’s right to govern, depoliticization is 
still found in the strong expert tone of policy-making (although the experts are now no longer 
experts rooted in parallel subcultures, tbut ad hoc ‘contractors’). If secrecy has diminished, 
policy-making is still far from transparent. And in some respects ‘summit diplomacy’ has been 
carried to new extremes in the institutionalized weekly meetings of the the Prime Minister, the 
two vice-premiers of the other two government parties and the leaders of the party groups 
supporting the cabinet, which precede each cabinet meeting. As ministers and 
undersecretaries of each governing party also meet separately before, with the party chairman 
of each party present as well, such ‘summits’ are indeed very well prepared. 
More generally: I am inclined to attribute the greatly increased t olerance for alternative 
lifestyles, as well as the relatively successful containment of racist parties, to the traditional 
pluralist and accommodationist styles of Dutch political culture. It would be wrong to regard the 
Dutch as being particularly tolerant or open-minded. But the inevitable living-together of very 
distinct groups in a small geographic space, has made sufferance of others at least a 
necessity, best solved by the principle of: leave well alone, whatever one’s gripes and 
complaints.  
There a re no strong pillars in the Netherlands anymore, but there continues to exist a great 
deal of accepted diversity which lessens conflict. I H S — Hans Daalder / The Netherlands: Still a Consociational Democracy?— 17 
Appendix  
The changing function of parties 
As my course at the Institute is on comparative parties and party systems,  allow me a 
digression on the changed position of political parties as a result of such processes. 
In the hey-day of verzuiling Dutch parties were, as I already said, mainly ‘holding companies’ 
and sentinels for the specific subculture they represented. Lists of candidates were drawn up 
on the basis of elaborate procedures which ensured the presence of spokesmen for the many 
specialized interests in their midst. A combination of religion and class largely structured the 
vote. Elections tended to be more a periodical census than an expression of concrete electoral 
opinions regarding policies or personalities. 
 Now, all this has changed: as the cohesion of the different subcultures broke down, as social 
organizations more and more went their separate ways irrespective of former ideological ties, 
and as voters became increasingly mobile, the role of parties changed substantially, in at least 
the following ways. 
The greater differentiation, professionalization and bureaucratization of special interest groups 
massively increased the number of political arenas and sites of decision-making. Decisions in 
such arenas are largely taken through direct bargaining. As special interests must deal 
routinely with governments whatever their particular party composition, they have an incentive 
to keep specific parties at arms’ length. ‘Party’, then, has no longer the instrumental value it 
once had for special interests, whether in representation or the taking of actual decisions.  
Parties on their part have tended to take more ‘autonomous’ stands, in a combination of choice 
and necessity. No longer certain of the natural and organized links they once had, they have 
had to operate in a more open political market. Whilst they might still want to cater to a variety 
to specialized interests, too close an identification with any one of them has threatened to 
become a liability. 
Internal party life also tended to evolve into the direction of more autonomy. While the 
aggregative and integrative role of parties in relation to groups went d own, the role of self-
starting politicians went up. Political recruitment came to be seen more in the light of careers, 
and less in terms of representation. The need for more active campaigning increased the role of 
media advisers. To the extent such advisers sought to ‘market’ parties in terms of 
personalities, and less as traditional ideological groupings or well thought-out programme 
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This in turn also changed the role of ordinary party members. As long as parties were the 
instruments of well-articulated subcultures, members were important both for political 
socialization and as active participants in election campaigns. The professionalization of the 
latter greatly lessened that role. Membership came to be less a matter of tradition and self-
evident civic commitment, and more a matter of temporary choice. Almost all parties began to 
experience a great loss of votes, and the remaining membership showed a much larger  
turnover, with members entering a nd leaving at a much faster rate. This did not mean that 
members have become less vociferous: although fewer in number, less institutionally anchored 
and often less persistently active, relatively small groups of party members may still press on 
behalf of  particular goals or personalities. Given the ready, if fleeting, attention the modern 
media are likely to give to any signs of protest, their influence is often magnified, although not 
necessarily long-lived. 
On the basis of an extensive, comparative review of such developments my successor at 
Leiden, Professor Peter Mair, has concluded that there is a definite paradox in the relationship 
between contemporary parties and society. If parties have lost in certain traditional functions of 
socialization, aggregation and integration, they have tended to become stronger in political 
recruitment and penetration. Their monopoly in determining the composition of parliament and 
cabinets has become virtually absolute, notwithstanding a widening gap between party 
personnel and ordinary voters. He attributes this development largely to the greater 
organizational resources of parties, which they owe in a large measure to new forms of 
government financing.
16  
In a comparative perspective the Netherlands does not provide the strongest example of such a 
development. The degree of government financing is still relatively low, and mainly indirect. The 
greater part of party income is still derived from membership contributions. The degree of 
buraucratic organization of the party and its subsidiary organizations is also very modest. The 
role of party in political recruitment and to some degree also in key administrative 
appointments has undoubtedly grown stronger. But the control of parties is far from enhaustive 
and exclusive: if t he choice of members of parliament is entirely a matter of within party 
decisions, this is already less so in the selection of cabinet members (where ministers and 
junior ministers often arrive on the basis of technical skill rather than partisan activity), let alone 
in the provision of government services. 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
16 See Peter Mair, Party Demcoracies and their Difficulties, inaugural lecture, Leiden, 1994; see also R.S. Katz 
and P. Mair (eds.)  How Parties Organize. Change and Adaptation in Party Organizations in Western 
Democracies. London: Sage, 1994; and Idem, ‘Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy. The 
Emergence of the Cartel Party’, Party Politics,  vol 1, nr. 1 (1995), pp. 5–28.. 